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Quantifying Uncertainty in Reliability
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BY
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M.S., Mathematics, University of New Mexico, 2010

ABSTRACT

Reliability analysis yields statistically derived technical system performance estimates.
Traditional reliability analysis employs classical statistical techniques predicated upon
asymptotic properties of large data sets. Not uncommonly, however, medium to small
data sets constrain analysis efforts for high risk systems characterized by significant
danger or cost. This paper outlines a general reliability analysis paradigm to contend
with small to medium data sets. Preliminary sensitivity analysis using scatter plots and
tests for non-randomness reveals component-level drivers in system-level performance
measures. Comprehensive data collection efforts targeting all available, high-quality
information sources decrease and allow analysts to estimate uncertainty in model
parameters describing driving component performance. Bayesian analysis accumulates
these data into posterior distributions summarizing all available performance knowledge
about driving components. Sampling-based uncertainty propagation methods then
transform component-level posterior distributions into system-level parent and sampling
distributions. Reliability metric point-estimates and credible intervals estimate the
v

system reliability and benchmark the quality of the estimates, respectively. An
operational reliability assessment of the B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B2-RMP)
modernized radar system demonstrates the mechanics of the analysis paradigm applied to
real data. Results from analysis including uncertainty explicitly modeled in all B-2 RMP
components benchmark results from analysis including uncertainty modeled for driving
components only.
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Chapter 1: Overview

“Beware of false knowledge; it is more dangerous than ignorance.” George Bernard Shaw
“Information is a source of learning. But unless it is organized, processed, and available to the right people
in a format for decision making, it is a burden, not a benefit.” William Pollard

1.1

Introduction

Mathematical models of real systems allow us to interpolate and extrapolate system
characteristics through time and space. However, models are, by definition,
approximations of what is real, and as such never include all information impacting
system properties. Model approximations can be known and deliberate, known and
unavoidable or unknown and unavoidable [1]. Known and deliberate approximations are
made in the interest of efficiency when their impact on results is minor relative to some
standard of accuracy and precision. Known and unavoidable approximations are made
due to an understood lack of knowledge about the system or due to inherent stochasticity
in the system. Unknown and unavoidable approximations occur when the system is so
poorly understood that analysts are unaware of the extent to which they lack important
knowledge about it. Known approximations can be explicitly defined and their effect on
model results can often be quantified. When model results inform decision making
processes that entail significant environmental, human health or financial risk,
accompanying definitions and estimates of the approximations used in the model help
decision makers benchmark the quality of the information contained in the results.
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The development and procurement of technical systems are often associated with nontrivial resource expenditures. These systems can also pose potential hazards to human
health and the environment. As a consequence, technical system performance estimates
play an important role in industrial and sociopolitical decision making processes. This
paper focuses on methods to quantify the approximations involved in the estimation of
technical system performance metrics using reliability block diagram models and
demonstrates an approximation analysis in a case study of the B-2 modernized radar
operational reliability assessment.

1.2

Reliability Analysis

Less than a century ago, the field of technical system reliability analysis arose in the
interest of assessing variation in airplane operational safety as a function of engine
number [2]. Since then, mass-production and rapidly evolving technological
sophistication in high-value/ high-consequence systems has inspired concurrent evolution
in reliability analysis sophistication and rigor. Lines of inquiry in reliability
investigations fall into one of three idiosyncratic domains: human reliability, software
reliability and hardware reliability [2]. Operations research analysts explore how
reliability estimates in these three domains combine to produce an overarching estimate
of human-in-the-loop, technical system reliability.

A subdivision within hardware reliability techniques occurs along the lines of physics
based versus actuarial-based approaches [2]. Physics-based approaches model the
2

strength, S, of a technical item and the load it will bear, L, as random variables. The
reliability of the item is defined as the probability that S is greater than L:

R = Pr(S>L)

Modifications of this equation to incorporate multiple dimensions including time are
standard. In the actuarial approach, all reliability information is subsumed in a time-tofailure (or a time-between failure if the system is repairable, cf. below) random variable,
Y (X if the system is repairable); a proxy for explicitly modeled physical variables such as
load and strength.

Technical systems undergo periods of reliability growth and decay. System reliability
during these periods is often determined using reliability distributions with timedependent parameters [3]. When not experiencing reliability growth or decay, a system
is said to be in a steady-state. Steady-state reliability regimes are easier to model since
reliability distributions during these periods have time-independent parameters. During
steady-state periods in the life history of a non-repairable system, the time-to-failure
distribution, , is the generator of all actuarial-based reliability metric estimates and
distributions [2,3]. In particular, the reliability distribution of a non-repairable system, ,
is defined as = 1 - . Thus, actuarial-based reliability measures the likelihood a system
will not fail during a particular time interval.

3

System reliability analysis explores how component-level reliability combines to affect
system-level reliability. This includes structural and compositional considerations. The
counter-intuitive result that a system composed of highly reliable components may still
exhibit low reliability is a consequence of emergent properties associated with the
structure, rather than the composition, of the system [2]. Somewhat more intuitively, the
location and dispersion of component-level time-to-failure or time-between-failures
distributions describing the random variable Y or X for each component,

also influence

system-level reliability.

Repairable and non-repairable system reliability investigations differ in complexity and
descriptive metrics. Common, non-repairable system reliability metrics include the
reliability function and mean time-to-failure (MTTF or

, where Y is the random

variable representing time-to-failure events). Repairable system reliability analysis
includes all metrics and distributions found in non-repairable system reliability along
with others that summarize system repair characteristics and operational capacity given
that the system is inoperable for time intervals due to repair events. Availability, mean
time-between-failures (MTBF or

where

is the random variable representing the

time the system is up), maintainability, and mean down-time (MDT or

where

is

the random variable representing the time the system is down) are typical metrics of
repairable system reliability [2,3]. Mean-time-between-failures is a measure of the time
the system is operating (e.g. not being repaired). Reliability metric nomenclature can be
misleading and care should be taken to investigate the formulae defining the metrics to
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ensure proper interpretation. Since repairable system models incorporate two random
varibles, X and D, the complexity of the analysis involved scales accordingly.

Actuarial-Based Reliability Analysis Using Reliability Block Diagrams

Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) are commonly used models in actuarial-based
reliability investigations. They provide both abstraction, leading to ease of solution and
system representation, and solution accuracy for a broad class of systems. System
models using RBDs incorporate independent, component-level random variable
distributions, such as time-to-failure distributions. The resolution of the system model
can be set arbitrarily based on how many component distributions it includes.
Component reliability distributions are represented schematically by blocks. The
architecture of the RBD represents how block random variable distributions combine
recursively to determine a random variable distribution of the system as a whole.

The basic recursive relationships are represented with series and parallel block structures
(cf. Figure 1 below). In the case where the component distributions are time-to-failure
distributions, a series structure including a set of blocks fails if one or more of the blocks
in the structure fail.

Figure 1: Basic Recursive Structures in an RBD

5

The analyst sets failure behavior of a parallel structure as a function of component block
failure to reflect how redundancy has been engineered into the system to improve
reliability. For instance, a parallel structure containing three blocks may fail if one, two
or three component blocks fail concurrently. Frequently, a fraction denotes the failure
behavior of a parallel structure. The denominator of this fraction is the total number of
blocks in the parallel structure while the numerator is the number of blocks that must
operate concurrently for the structure to operate. RBD models usually display these
fractions in an obvious manner in relation to each parallel structure. A parallel structure
that fails when only one component block fails is isomorphic to a series structure
containing the same number of blocks.

In a well-formed RBD, connections between the components and their positions relative
to one another clearly manifest the manner in which individual component reliability
combines to affect system reliability as a whole. RBD components are generally defined
so that component random variables are independent. Some RBD software packages
allow users to define dependencies between components. When this is not sufficient,
other models, such as Markov Chains, are more appropriate [2].

Figure 2 depicts a small RBD model. For simplicity, assume this is a non-repairable
system and that the Fja, j=1,2,..,5 are time-to-failure distributions. Note the ½ following
each of the two parallel structures in this diagram. This indicates that the parallel
structure remains operating if one out of the two constituent components is operating.

6

Appendix A outlines the process of computing the analytical time-to-failure distribution
for this system.

Figure 2: A simple RBD composed of series and parallel structures

Monte-Carlo Simulation Applied to RBDs

For simple RBDs like the one depicted in Figure 2, it is possible to analytically define the
system random variable distributions as functions of block random variable distributions.
While it is in principle possible to evaluate these functions, it is often impractical for
systems with many components and parallel architectures. Even defining a functional
relationship between block random variables and system random variables is impractical
for many classes of sufficiently complex systems. Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is an
attractive alternative to explicit evaluation of RBD system-level random variable
distributions. The goal of generic MC simulation is to estimate an unknown parameter or
unknown parameters, such as the mean and standard deviation, of some distribution. In
the MC community, this distribution is called the “parent distribution” [4]. The parent
distribution for a RBD is the system-level random variable distribution of interest, e.g.
the system time-to-failure distribution, denoted Fa.
7

Using a random sampling technique, one MC run generates one point in the parent
distribution. Multiple runs constitute an MC simulation and result in an estimate of the
parent distribution. Thus, with infinite time and/or resources, it is theoretically possible
to exactly form a parent distribution from block random variable distributions. However,
practical limits on resources dictate that the MC generated parent distribution will always
be approximate. Such an approximation amounts to a known error due to finite, random
sampling in the algorithm.

From the approximate parent distribution, it is possible to calculate an estimate of its
unknown parameter(s) using a function (usually a linear combination of the points
comprising the parent distribution) called an “estimator” [4,5]. The estimator, being a
function of parent distribution data generated from randomly selected input distribution
data, is itself a random variable. Repeated runs generate a distribution of the estimator,
called “the sampling distribution.” A sampling distribution is the distribution of a
parameter corresponding to a parent distribution. Figure 3 schematically represents the
flow of generic MC simulation applied to an RBD model.

Thus, MC simulations generate estimations of unknown parameters that have a known,
quantifiable error. Sampling distribution dispersion arises from the randomly, finitely
determined parent distribution. This, in turn, is a consequence of random, finite sampling
data from the input distributions used to define the parent distribution. However,
according to The Central Limit Theorem, as the number of points used to generate the
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sampling distribution increases, the sampling distribution becomes approximately
normal with mean equal to the parameter of interest [5].

Commercial software programs that use RBDs with Monte Carlo Methods implement
various algorithms [17]. It is important to consult user manuals to understand software
specific algorithms. Different Monte Carlo algorithms entail different standard error in
the sampling distributions. The solutions for some systems may diverge beyond an
acceptable tolerance due to algorithmic differences [6]. Determining which package to
use under such circumstances would entail more detailed analysis of the interplay
between the system of interest and the structure of the different software algorithms.

The ultimate goal of the RBD/MC simulation is to find unbiased, minimum variance
estimators of the parameters of the system-level parent distributions such as timebetween-failures distributions, Fa [4]. Generally, the user defines a relevant time span for
the simulation based on system properties, such as estimated obsolescence, or segregated
reliability regimes that should be simulated separately so that distribution parameters are
approximately time-independent, such as short growth period intervals and steady-state.
During this time span, the simulation samples randomly from the block distributions.
Directly and indirectly, these samples constitute data points that combine to form systemlevel random variable distributions, i.e. the parent distributions. At the end of the
simulation time span, system quantities such as reliability are computed as averages of
these distributions over time as well as averages over system state space, e.g. the timebetween- failures event space.

9
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Figure 3: Flow of Monte Carlo analysis applied to RBD

1.3

Approximations in Analysis

As mentioned above, results derived from Monte Carlo simulations are approximate in
the sense that they are computed using a finite number of samples from continuous input
distributions. The magnitude of Monte Carlo approximation is a function of the number
of points used in the estimator computation and the number of estimator points used to
define the sampling distribution. Due to time and resource constraints as well as
constraints introduced by boundary conditions on equations governing the simulation, it
is not always possible to increase these two factors arbitrarily to get MC approximations
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down to an acceptable tolerance. In this case, a quantified estimate of the sampling
distribution dispersion can benchmark how approximate MC results are.

Equations from probability theory quantify MC approximations when the estimated
parameter is a mean [7]. However, approximations from other non-Monte Carlo sources
in analysis endeavors are not so readily quantifiable. This poses a serious problem when
analytical results guide policy affecting public safety and significant resource
expenditures. Under such circumstances, estimates of the accuracy and precision of
analytical conclusions inform policy makers about whether such results posses sufficient
integrity to be used as a basis for decision making.

All analysis endeavors approximate a physical system with some sort of model. Sets of
initial and boundary conditions and descriptions of variables and their respective
couplings define models of systems that are not changing, or static, in some reference
frame. A model may be as simple as a single deterministic equation or as complex as
architectures of nested systems of equations. The amount of detail included in a model is
a function of the types of problems for which it is intended to facilitate solution, desired
solution accuracy, and efficiency concerns.

However, no matter the level of detail included in an analytical model, it is still an
approximation of the physical world. Analytical results will therefore always have some
inherent bias and/or dispersion with respect to an unknown true value. A complete
model includes an explicit description of all known approximations entailed in its
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development as well as the motivation behind and possible limitations arising from these
approximations.

There is no unified approach to defining and quantifying approximations resulting in bias
and dispersion in modeling and simulation results. Oberkampf et al., attempt to
synthesize various and disparate contributions to this end accumulated over many years
from a variety of fields [1]. They divide approximation sources into three categories:
variability, uncertainty, and error.

Variability is a consequence of inherent randomness in the system being modeled and as
such is an irreducible approximation. Uncertainty results from a lack of knowledge about
the system. Because it is possible to accumulate more knowledge about a system via
experimentation or research, uncertainty is a reducible approximation. This paper
follows widely used nomenclature replacing the terms variability and uncertainty with
aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty, respectively [8]. Dispersion in the
random variable distributions characterizing each block in an RBD model is a
manifestation of aleatory uncertainty. Greater dispersion in these distributions entails
greater aleatory uncertainty in the model of the block. Because an analyst does not know
the exact form of the block random variable distributions with arbitrary precision,
epistemic uncertainty arises in the block distribution parameters. As a consequence, the
parameters of the block distributions themselves can be characterized using distributions.
In this case, the parameter random variable distribution dispersion represents the degree
of epistemic uncertainty in the value of the parameter.
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Error is a recognizable deficiency in the modeling and simulation process that is not due
to lack of information. Errors can be isolated, described, and controlled using proper
protocols. Errors can arise in RBD models due to approximations made while defining
the block variables and their interactions. Since the block random variables must be
independent, analysts frequently combine blocks with coupled variables into one block.
This approximation decreases the resolution of the model by neglecting the constituent
contributions and interactions of the subsumed components, resulting in known errors.
Approximations from Monte Carlos simulations, if incorporated into the RBD model,
also constitute errors. These are known approximations that can be quantified either
analytically or by some other means such as bootstrapping methods [7].

Bayesian Inference and Exploratory Sensitivity Analysis

Implicit in traditional RBD/MC algorithms is the assumption that component-level
distribution parameters are known with arbitrary precision. However, epistemic
uncertainty in model parameters is almost always present to some extent, especially in
low-data scenarios when large deviations from this approximation can result in
incomplete, misleading results. There are several approaches to representing and
transforming epistemic uncertainty [1,8]. When an analyst uses distributions to represent
uncertainty in block parameters, the machinery of probability theory and statistics
becomes available to transform the uncertainty in a model.
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Modeling block parameters with distributions introduces an additional component-level
random variable into the model. Section 1.2 defined X and D as the random variables
describing the aleatory uncertainty in the uptimes (times-between-failures) and
downtimes of a repairable system. Now, with the addition of epistemic uncertainty in the
model, each influential block has one or more random variables describing the epistemic
uncertainty in the parameters of the aleatory uncertainty distributions.

Bayesian statistical inference provides a systematic means to define and update these
epistemic uncertainty random variables as more information become available. Under
these circumstances, test data can be incorporated with additional information, such as
past performance data, subject-matter expert knowledge, software model results and
performance data of similar systems. In low data scenarios, including all sources of
quality information in analysis can drastically improve fidelity in decision-driving results.

Bayesian Inference requires two basic inputs in the form of distributions. The first

,

called “the prior distribution,” represents information about a parameter, , available
prior to a data collection event [3,9]. Dispersion in

quantifies the level of epistemic

uncertainty about the parameter remaining after accounting for available information
prior to testing. The prior distribution can encompass past testing and performance
information as well as information garnered during a subject matter expert elicitation.
The second input distribution,

, called “the likelihood distribution,” is a summary

of recently collected data not included in the prior distribution determination. Dispersion

14

in

represents the amount of aleatory uncertainty surrounding the item being

tested.

A conditional probability distribution, computed using Bayes’ Theorem (cf. equation (1)),
incorporates the information contained in the likelihood distribution (component-level
mean response and variability) into the component-level parameter information
summarized by the prior distribution. The resultant “posterior distribution,”

,

contains information from both the prior distribution and the test data.

(1)

The analytical tractability of the conditional probability distribution defining the posterior
in (1) is determined by the tractability of the integral in the denominator. This integral
can be solved for many types of prior distribution when the likelihood is distributed as a
standard exponential with only one uncertain parameter, the scale parameter (cf.
Appendix B and C). Frequently, the likelihood distribution can be approximated well by
one of the common distribution types. If the prior is then modeled using a distribution
called the “conjugate” of the likelihood distribution type, the likelihood and prior
distributions are called a “conjugate pair,” and the posterior can be obtained analytically.
Using conjugate pairs imposes restrictions on the prior distribution type, however.

Tables of conjugate pairs and formulas describing the resultant posterior type as a
function of the likelihood variable and parameter(s) and prior variable and parameter(s)
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are available in the literature [9]. In the interest of completeness, this paper includes an
analytical derivation of several posteriors (cf. Appendices B and C for details). The
posterior results given an exponential likelihood for a single observation y, i.e.
, and gamma prior over

with parameters,

are summarized below:

=

(2)

As is always the case with conjugate pairs, the posterior here has the same distribution
type as the prior, a gamma, with different parameters, shape parameter,
parameter,

, and scale

.

In situations where the conjugate pair approximation is too restrictive, WinBUGS [10],
YADAS [3] or other software suites compute posteriors from arbitrary likelihood and
prior distributions. These packages use variations of Markov Chain Monte Carlo to
approximate the posterior. Although these packages are versatile, the posteriors they
produce are approximations, including error associated with the sampling based
algorithms used to generate them.

The first step in Bayesian inference involves modeling the input distributions. The
likelihood distribution is specified analytically (cf. Appendices B and C). Accumulating
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prior information from diverse sources into one prior distribution is less straightforward.
One method consists of iteratively applying Bayes’ Theorem to distributions formed from
different data sources.

Generating accurate and precise prior distributions can be a time and resource intensive
process requiring ingenuity and careful planning [8,9,11,12]. Isolating the most
influential component-level parameters with a sensitivity analysis circumvents the need
to explicitly model priors for non-influential components. Conclusions from a sensitivity
analysis conducted on a model before an uncertainty analysis aid analysts in determining
how to reduce the dimensionality of the epistemic uncertainty in the model and, hence,
the expense entailed by the uncertainty analysis.

Approaches to sensitivity analysis differ depending on the type of model involved and
scope of inquiry desired. Saltelli et al., categorize sensitivity analysis approaches
according to scope of inquiry [13]. Factor Screening involves isolating important factors
(inputs) in a system with many factors. Local Sensitivity Analysis emphasizes the local
impact of factors on a system and is typically accomplished analytically using partial
derivatives. Global Sensitivity Analysis emphasizes apportioning uncertainty in output to
uncertainty in input factors. Alternative sensitivity analysis taxonomies defined in terms
of model efficiency (expensive vs. cheap), model type (e.g. linear vs. nonlinear,
monotonic vs. non-monotonic), approach (analytical vs. sampling based) or fidelity
(using the model directly vs. using a meta-model to approximate the model) also serve as
helpful guides in choosing the best approach for specific analytical regimes [8,13].
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In the case where the model is a black box, sensitivity analysis techniques accurate for
specific model types are inappropriate. The schematic design and recursive nature of, as
well as the nested sampling loops in RBDs models including epistemic uncertainty place
these models in the black box category. In this case, scatter plots can give insights about
implicit relationships between component-level and system-level epistemic uncertainty
without any assumptions about the functional form of the relationship.

After approximate relationships have been discerned from scatter plots, tests for nonrandomness such as the Common Means Test, the Common Locations Test, the
Statistical Independence Test, the Regression Test and the Quadratic Regression Test can
quantify and rank inputs according to influence upon output response. Because these
tests work well for specific model types, information in scatter plots should inform the
weight an analyst gives to specific test results. In tandem, these sensitivity analysis
techniques provide an estimate of the global main effects, or drivers, in the system
response.

If a sensitivity analysis reveals that output responses are insensitive to changes in one or
more input variables, point estimates of these variables can be used in the model in lieu
of distributions. For RBD/MC simulations incorporating estimates of epistemic
uncertainty in component parameters, this amounts to discovering that system-level
epistemic uncertainty is unaffected by epistemic uncertainty in some component-level
parameters. Investing resources into characterizing epistemic uncertainty distributions
for these parameters is therefore unnecessary.

18

Bayesian statistical methods provide a means to characterize and iteratively decrease
epistemic uncertainty in a parameter as more information becomes available.
Augmenting commercial RBD/MC algorithms by using distributions to represent
epistemic uncertainty and Bayesian inference to update epistemic uncertainty
distributions as new information becomes available is a logical next step in honing
reliability analysis. In the area of system reliability analysis, Bayesian methods will most
commonly apply at the component-level to update epistemic uncertainty in componentlevel parameter distributions. As a consequence, uncertainty propagation methods are
necessary to make inferences about how these component-level transformations translate
to the system-level.

Uncertainty Analysis

RBD/MC commercial software sampling propagates aleatory uncertainty from the
component to the system level. An additional sampling layer applied to component
parameter distributions representing epistemic uncertainty produces a system-level
epistemic uncertainty distribution and a suite of system-level aleatory uncertainty
distributions. Figure 4 depicts the flow of the simulation including the additional
sampling layer. The system-level epistemic uncertainty distribution summarizes the
cumulative effect of epistemic uncertainty in influential component-level distributions. It
serves as an important benchmark of the precision in the analytical process.

After forming influential component priors and generating posteriors, samples drawn
from each of the influential component parameter uncertainty distributions (the posterior
19

distributions derived from Bayesian inference) n times produce n parameter vectors.
Each of the n parameter vectors is (1 x m), where m is the number of influential blocks in
the RBD model. The vectors comprise randomly-grouped sets of parameter samples,
with one sample from each influential block. Each parameter vector defines a set of
block distribution parameters to be used as input for a standard RBD/MC algorithm.
Non-influential component parameters are fixed at their point-estimate values in the
simulation. These point estimates can be obtained using historical data or from subject
matter expert estimations.

For inexpensive models, using MC sampling in the outer sampling layer is simple and
yields good results with large sample sizes. Medium to large RBD models entail longer
simulation times, imposing limits on system-level sample generation, however. In these
cases, strategic sampling from input distributions can survey the input variable space with
fewer samples than simple random sampling, thus decreasing the number of model
evaluations necessary to map the output space. Stratified sampling and Latin Hypercube
sampling are popular alternatives to random sampling when model evaluations are
expensive [8,14,15].

Stratified sampling involves partitioning a set into mutually exclusive, exhaustive subsets
(strata) [8]. Random samples from these subsets comprise a stratified sample.
Partitioning allows an analyst to assure that important events in the set are included in the
sample, even if these events have small associated probability.
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Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) presents a useful compromise between stratified and
simple random sampling in several respects [8,14,15]. Like stratified sampling, LHS
involves partitioning a set into mutually exclusive, exhaustive subsets. LHS differs from
stratified sampling, however, in that the intervals defining the subsets are equally spaced.
Consequently, the analyst only defines the total number of intervals desired, and not their
ranges. For most models, LHS estimator convergence improves upon the estimator
convergence of simple random sampling [8,14,15]. Furthermore, implementation of LHS
requires less time and skill than is required in stratified sampling schemes because it is
not necessary to define strata and their associated probabilities [14]. Because model
evaluations are expensive for the B-2 modernized radar RBD, the outer sampling loop for
the sensitivity and uncertainty analysis presented in Chapter 2 uses LHS.

The output of the entire simulation is a set of sampling distributions of the mean, one
generated from each parameter vector. The means of these sampling distributions exhibit
dispersion due to the uncertainty in the block parameters as well as sampling error
incurred during the simulation. The dispersion of the means can be used to calculate
approximate credibility intervals that quantify uncertainty in system parameters (cf.
figure 4). However, when model evaluations are expensive and place limitations on
system-level data generation, finite sampling error could significantly affect the estimated
system-level epistemic uncertainty distribution.

It is possible to estimate the cumulative effect of the error from the two sampling sources.
When the parameter of interest is a mean, error due to finite MC sampling executed in
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System RBD

Blocks

Parent Distribution
(e.g. Time Between Failures)

Monte
Carlo
Simulation

Dispersion Due to Variability
in Component

Estimator
Computation

Estimated Parameter
Sample (e.g. MTBF)

Dispersion Due
to Variability in System

Repeated Monte Carlo Simulations and Estimator Computation
Dispersion Due to Finite
Sampling Error in MC

Sampling
Distribution
(e.g. a distribution of
MTBF values)

The Mean of the
Sampling Distribution
is Equal to the
Parameter of Intrest

Figure 4: Depiction of the system-level uncertainty analysis conducted
by applying an extra layer of sampling from parameter distributions

RBD/MC software is summarized via the standard error of the mean, denoted seF( . In
this notation, x is a random variable with distribution F and
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is the mean of a random

sample taken from the set of events represented by x. The standard error of any estimator
is a common indicator of statistical accuracy [7]. RBD/MC software suites output a
seF(

for all mean estimates. By the Central Limit Theorem, as the number, k, of

samples increases, the sampling distribution of the mean approaches a normal with
standard deviation equal to the seF(

[5,7]. The sampling distribution with mean equal

to the estimated mean and standard deviation equal to the seF(

summarizes the error in

the mean estimate due to finite sampling in the RBD/MC simulation.

seF(

(3)

A bootstrap method can be used to estimate the cumulative effect of both the MC and the
LHS sampling error. In this method, l bootstrap sample vectors are generated by
sampling with replacement p times from an empirical distribution composed of p
observed values [7]. In the case of RBD models including epistemic uncertainty, an
observed value is the system-level metric (usually an approximate mean value),
generated by RBD/MC software for each of the

parameter sample vectors.

Recall that LHS, stratified sampling or MC methods produced the p parameter sample
vectors used as inputs for the RBD/MC simulation.

So, we get a sample of size p,

by sampling

with replacement l times. Further, substituting a random sample from
for each

in a bootstrap sample accounts for the inner MC sampling
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error. The sampling with replacement of the

accounts for the outer loop sampling

error. CDFs formed using these new observed bootstrap sample vectors can then be used
to approximate point wise confidence bands around the epistemic uncertainty curve.
These bounds estimate the amount of error incurred in the two sampling loops (cf.
Appendix D for further details).

In sum, the steps outlined above culminate in an uncertainty CDF, bounded by
confidence bands estimating the magnitude of the sampling error in the uncertainty
analysis. The uncertainty CDF can be used to compute metric point-estimates as well as
credible intervals defining the fidelity of the point-estimates. Additionally, the fidelity of
the uncertainty CDF itself is quantified using point wise confidence bands. Because a
preliminary sensitivity analysis reduces the dimensionality of the epistemic uncertainty
probability space, this analysis paradigm generates results with more information than a
point estimate using minimal information from the input space. Of course, there is no
free lunch in nature; the cost of this trade-off is the increased effort introduced into the
analysis by the sensitivity analysis. The next section applies the process outlined above
to real data taken from the B-2 modernized radar program operational reliability tests.
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Chapter 2: Operational Reliability Assessment of the
B-2 Modernized Radar System

At the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), we test and
evaluate new weapon system capabilities in operationally realistic battle space
environments. Operational test (OT) data are obtained from a production-representative
system in an operationally realistic environment. Reliability analysis plays a key role in
defining measures of operational capability.

AFOTEC consists of a headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico and five detachments
spread throughout the U.S. Each detachment specializes in operational evaluation of
specific classes of technical systems used in the Air Force. For example, Detachment 5 in
California works with mobility, bomber, command and control, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance weapon systems. Analysts at AFOTEC headquarters are tasked to
support test teams and analysts at the detachments as needed.

Air Force leadership compares results from OT analysis to standards stipulated in
contracts between the developer and the Air Force (the purchaser). When OT results
indicate that the system performance is lacking significantly, the developer is obliged to
discover and modify the source of the shortfall prior to large scale production. OT
analysis also provides logistics information to aid decision makers on how to best support
the war fighter using these systems in wartime scenarios. Since large sums of tax-payer
money as well as the lives of civilian and military personnel hinge on these
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considerations, estimates of fidelity in operational reliability analysis results provide
crucial information for decision makers.

2.1

The B-2 Radar Modernization Program

The Air Force recently contracted Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) to incorporate
new technology into the B-2 bomber radar system. This project, deemed the B-2
Modernized Radar Program (B-2 RMP), included the following adaptations to the legacy
radar system:

-R/E (receiver exciter) modified (6 shop replaceable units) to accommodate radar
modernization program (RMP) requirements
-Legacy antenna replaced with new AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array)
antenna assemblies: AESA includes all legacy antenna functionalities combined with the
functionalities contained in the legacy transmitters. Northrop Grumman Corporation
(NGC) lead B-2 RMP engineer, Steve Ruch, considers the legacy antenna and the AESA
“totally different technologies.”
-Legacy transmitters removed
- WG-SW (Wave-Guide Switch) is new
-Electrical power to the AESA provided by new PPCU (Prime Power Conditioning
Units)
-DMS RFFE modified to provide RF signal protection from on-board radar emissions at
the new operating frequency (not considered part of the radar system and not modeled in
RBD)
-The Ku Band Transponder LRUs modified to accommodate the new operating
frequency (not considered part of the radar system and not modeled in RBD)
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Upon release, Detachment 5 of AFOTEC initiated an operational performance evaluation
on several production-representative prototypes of the B-2 modernized radar. Part of this
evaluation included reliability testing and analysis to determine the values of several
relevant performance metrics. The figure of merit MTBF, E(X), mean time-betweenfailures, was highlighted by Air Force leadership amongst these as particularly relevant.
Sparse operational test data available for the B-2 RMP system due to resource and time
constraints limited the accuracy and precision of classical statistical analysis for this
system. Consequently, analysts at AFOTEC headquarters were tasked to develop an
alternative analysis paradigm to contend with this and other increasingly common low to
medium data scenarios.

To leverage the more prolific component-level data, the AFOTEC bomber analysts at
Detachment 5 used a reliability block diagram developed by NGC representing the
modernized radar system. The RBD underwent an internal accreditation process at
AFOTEC prior to being used in this analysis. The final accredited RBD is shown below
in Figure 5. As a repairable system, the model of each component, i, incorporates two
types of aleatory uncertainty random variable:
variable, and

, the time-between-failures random

, the down-time random variable.

The two aleatory random variables for each component and its mirror image, henceforth
called a redundant structure, are defined independently and identically. Component-
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Figure 5: B-2 RMP (Radar Modernization Program) Reliability Block Diagram

Repair Distribution Type

Mean

Std. Dev.

Antenna

Lognormal

8

0.5

MSS

Lognormal

3

0.5

PPCU

Lognormal

2

0.5

R/E

Lognormal

4

0.5

RDP

Lognormal

2

0.5

RSP

Lognormal

3

0.5

WG-SW

Lognormal

5

0.5

CONSTANT OVER
ENTIRE ANALYSIS

Table 1. Parameter values for component repair distributions

level time-between-failures probability spaces are summarized in the model with
exponential distributions,

, while lognormal down-time distributions,

, describe each component’s down-time probability space (cf. Tables 1
and 2). AFOTEC bomber analysts and NGC engineers estimated
At headquarters, we determined estimates for

using legacy data collected by AFOTEC

and research and development (R&D) data amassed at NGC.
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in the model.

Time-Between-Failure

=

Distribution Type
RDP

Exponential

1/1879.2

RSP

Exponential

1/2349

R/E

Exponential

1/804

WG-SW

Exponential

1/11,437.80

PPCU

Exponential

1/61,348

MSS

Exponential

1/1566

Antenna

Exponential

1/2412

Table 2. Parameter values for component failure distributions

2.2

Preliminary Sensitivity Analysis

To begin the reliability analysis, we conducted a preliminary sensitivity analysis on the
accredited RBD model described above to isolate and characterize the most influential
components affecting epistemic uncertainty in B-2 RMP MTBF estimates. We used
RAPTOR RBD/MC software (developed at AFOTEC) for the RBD/MC portion of our
analysis. RAPTOR provides many unique capabilities necessary for the simulation of
Air Force technical systems not found in other RBD/MC software suites.
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The preliminary sensitivity analysis focused on how epistemic uncertainty in the
component-level time-between-failures distribution parameter,

, affected epistemic

uncertainty in the system-level MTBF only. We held the repair distribution parameters
constant throughout the analysis. We modeled the epistemic uncertainty in the seven
redundant-structure scale parameters with a uniformly distributed random variable,
centered at

with range [0, 2

], where

is the estimated mean of

using legacy and R&D test data (cf. Table 3), e.g.

,

determined

.

Then, using the R function for Latin Hypercube sampling, we produced 100 randomly
grouped (1x7) parameter vectors with components from these distributions. Each vector
served as the time-between-failures distribution parameter input for one RBD/MC
simulation. We set the termination point of the simulation at 131,534.1 simulated hours
to ensure that the

was no larger than approximately one percent of the system-

level MTBF. The entire process produced 100 estimates of system-level MTBF as a
function of component parameter

changes.

Although one of the simplest sensitivity analysis techniques, scatter plots are robust in
that they do not require any assumptions about the functional form of the relationships
being explored [8,13]. Because the

samples spanned a broad range including very

small numbers, we used scatter plots of mean system-level response

versus

) for each of the seven redundant structures as a first step in determining possible
relationships between system and component-level uncertainty (cf. Figure 6 below). As
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Component

Mean

Interval

Antenna

1/2412

[0,1/1206]

Uniform

MSS

1/56376

[0,1/28188]

Distribution

PPCU

1/61,348

[0,1/30674]

Parameters

R/E

1/804

[0,1/402]

RDP

1/46980

[0,1/23490]

RSP

1/37584

[0,1/18792]

WGSW

1/11437.8

[0,1/5718.9]

Table 3: Component uniform distribution parameters

demonstrated in Figure 6, the MSS and Antenna

appear to result in systematic

changes in the system MTBF over the entire range of parameter values. The other
component types demonstrate little influence on the system MTBF over the entire sample
range.

The approximate relationships demonstrated in the scatter plots allowed us to apply
quantitative, model-dependent tests for non-randomness to the data in a more informed
manner. There appeared to be no obviously non-monotonic relationships. Furthermore,
it seemed that the system-level MTBF, as a function of

could be reasonably

approximated using a linear or quadratic function of these variables. The common means
test (CMT), common locations test (CLT), test for statistical independence (SI),
regression test (REG) and quadratic regression test (QREG) are accurate for determining
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Scatterplot of log(B2-Modernized Radar System MTBF) vs. log(PPCU Lambda)
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Figure 6: Scatterplots of

System MTBF) vs.
), for i = 1, 2, …, 7 for each of the seven
redundant structures

general relationships, failing only in pathological cases. REG is accurate when
identifying linear relationships, while QREG is accurate when identifying quadratic
relationships.

Non-randomness tests such as the common means test (CMT), the common locations test
(CLT), and the test for statistical independence (SI) involve partitioning the scatter-plot
abscissa (as well as the ordinate for the SI test) into disjoint classes and determining if the
data across the classes share common statistics (e.g. the mean for the CMT, the median
for the CLT or the chi-square test for contingency tables for SI). If they do, it is less
likely there is a relationship between the dependent and independent variable [8]. The
regression (REG) and quadratic regression (QREG) tests involve fitting a surface (linear
in the case of REG, quadratic in the case of QREG) to the data and testing to see if the
coefficient of a predictor variable is significantly larger than zero. If it is, there is a
significant relationship between that predictor and the response variable [8].
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For each test, p-values quantify the level of non-randomness in the predictor/response
variable relationship. A small p-value corresponds to low level of randomness in the
relationship (e.g. small p-value indicates a significant relationship between the predictor
and response variable). As can be seen by the small associated p-values in Table 4, the
CMT, CLT, SI, REG, and QREG tests confirm that the MSS and antenna

dispersion

exerts significant influence on the system MTBF. Although not apparent in the scatter
plot, the non-randomness tests isolated the RE
QREG tests designated the WG-SW

as influential as well. The REG and

as a driver in the model.

The small number of components in the system as well as the high-level of symmetry
facilitates a comparison of these quantitative results with qualitative, more intuitive
notions of how specific blocks should influence system reliability measures. The first
group of redundant blocks: RSP, RDP and R/E, are paired in a one-out-of-two
configuration, meaning that only one of the two redundant blocks needs to be operational
to keep the system operational. Thus, the system should not be very sensitive to
individual downing events in these blocks.

The subsequent two groups, including the WG-SW, PPCU, MSS and antenna
components, are two-out-of-two redundant structures, meaning blocks in both parallel
strings must operate if the system is to remain operational. Individual, component-level
downing events in these groups result in a system-level downing event, e.g. the system
should be more sensitive to component-level failures for these blocks. The fact that the
system MTBF is insensitive to PPCU and WG-SW parameters is possibly due to some
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interplay between their repair distribution parameters and the portion of the parameter
space from which we sampled.

Statistical
Common Means Test

Common Locations Test

(CMT)

(CLT)

Independence Test (SI)

Input

MSS

Antenna

RE

MSS

Antenna

RE

MSS

Antenna

P-val

0

0

0.0366

0

0

0.0353

0

0.00008

Regression Test

Quadratic Regression Test

(REG)

(QREG)

Input

MSS

Antenna

RE

WGSW

MSS

Antenna

RE

WGSW

P-val

0.0016

0.0029

0.0181

0.0393

0

0

0.0193

0.0410

Table 4: P-values from five different non-randomness tests

The preliminary sensitivity analysis conducted via an accredited reliability block diagram
of the B-2 RMP indicates that the most influential failure distribution parameters on the
system-level mean response (MTBF) are those of the MSS and the Antenna. These two
components appear to drive epistemic uncertainty in B-2 RMP system-level MTBF and
thus, indirectly, other reliability measures (cf. reference [2] for equations relating MTBF
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to other reliability measures). Accurate, well-defined and precise descriptions of
reliability measures for such drivers directly entail more informative, higher fidelity
system-level measures.

2.3

Component-Level Epistemic Uncertainty Modeling and
Minimization with Bayesian Inference

Prior Determination

For the purposes of benchmarking the preliminary sensitivity analysis results, we
modeled distributions representing epistemic uncertainty in both driving and noninfluential components. This allowed us to compare results from the full model,
including epistemic uncertainty distributions for all components, with those from the
reduced model, containing epistemic uncertainty distributions for driving components
only. Because NGC modeled all component failure distributions as exponential, we
modeled all observations constituting the likelihood distributions derived from test data
as exponentials. In order to facilitate calculations, we modeled each component-level
prior distribution on

as a gamma, the conjugate prior of an exponential likelihood. To

this end, we used a formula cited by NIST on its Bayesian reliability website to form
gamma priors from legacy data [16]. According to the NIST formula, the gamma prior
shape parameter is defined as the number of recorded failures in the historical data, the
scale parameter the reciprocal of the total time during which failure data were logged.
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The NIST formula can be derived from first principles by taking a uniform prior on
[0,

(an uninformative prior) and forming a posterior using the legacy data as a

likelihood in the limiting case where

(cf. Appendix B). When new test data

defining another likelihood distribution becomes available, the posterior formed above
can be inputted as the prior to be updated using Bayes’ Theorem. Thus, Bayesian
analysis enables iterative model “learning” as more information from test data becomes
available.

However, this method assumes that legacy and RMP components are equivalent; an
assumption that is not valid for new or modified RMP components. For these
components, the prior parameters can be informed by legacy data only to the extent that
the RMP components resemble the legacy components. NGC R&D (research and
development) test data for the new and modified components provides additional
reliability information for new and modified components.

To reconcile R&D and legacy data sources for the new and modified components,
weighted averages of historical data and R&D estimates for the new and modified
components would most accurately serve as prior parameter estimates. The weights
would reflect an estimate of the deviation of the RMP components from the legacy
components. That is, the larger the technological deviation of the RMP components from
legacy components, the larger the weight attributed to the R&D data in the prior
parameter estimates.
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Unfortunately, the NGC engineers with the expertise to estimate such weights were not
contracted to provide this information or any additional information about uncertainty in
the component-level drivers. As a consequence, we took a conservative approach here,
and the new and modified component priors do not incorporate historical data, only NGC
R&D data. We used the NIST formula with the R&D data likelihood to define prior
distribution parameters for these components. NGC was the only source of additional
information that could decrease and further characterize epistemic uncertainty in driving
component parameters. Therefore, the driver parameters do not incorporate additional
information to decrease uncertainty and increase the resolution of the models
representing uncertainty in these component parameters. AFOTEC legal counsel is in
the process of investigating alternatives to existing contracts that would oblige
contractors to provide this information for future systems. The following summarizes the
considerations we used to form each component-level prior:

The Antenna is a new component incorporating the legacy antenna and transmitter. In
NGC R&D testing, it failed one time during a total of 2412 hours. This results in a
gamma prior with shape parameter 1 and scale parameter 1/2412.

The PPCU is a new component with no analog in legacy test data. It experienced zero
failures during R&D testing. NGC estimated steady state MTBF using the Duane model
is 61,348 hrs. The PPCU prior shape parameter in this case is estimated to be 1, the scale
to be 1/61,348.
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The WG-SW is another new component with no analog in legacy test data. MTBF
estimated by NGC using Raptor to be 11436.8. Using 1/11436.8 as the prior scale
parameter, the prior shape parameter was set at 1.

Component

Shape

Scale

Antenna

1

1/2412

Gamma

MSS

6

1/9396

Prior

PPCU

1

1/61,348

Parameters

R/E

1

1/804

RDP

5

1/9396

RSP

4

1/9396

WGSW

1

1/11437.8

Table 5: Component Prior Gamma Failure Distribution Parameters

The R/E was modified in RMP. NGC encountered one failure for this component in 804
hours of R&D testing which translates to a prior with shape parameter 1 and scale
parameter 1/804. Although the R/E appears to have undergone significant modifications,
it is considered “modified” rather than “new” by NGC.

The MSS, RDP, RSP are all legacy components. Prior parameters consisted of the total
number of failures in legacy data as the shape parameter and the inverse of total time
during which failures were logged as the scale parameter (Table 5).
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Posterior Determination

Appendix C details the derivation of the formula for defining gamma posteriors from a
gamma prior/exponential likelihood conjugate pair when the likelihood data is failure
truncated. The resultant posterior shape parameter is simply the sum of the total number
of failures in the likelihood data and the shape parameter of the prior. The reciprocal of
the scale parameter is the sum of the total test time in the likelihood data and the inverse
scale parameter of the prior. These very simple, closed-form posterior parameter
equations are a consequence of the gamma prior and exponential likelihood being a
conjugate pair. For arbitrary likelihood and prior distribution types, MCMC software or
analytical solutions to integral equations provide estimates of posterior parameters.

AFOTEC conducted two sets of operational tests. The first included all B-2 modernized
radar components and was time truncated (e.g. the test stopped at a specific time rather
than after a specific number of failures). The second included only the antenna and the
R/E and was failure truncated (e.g. the test stopped after a stipulated number of failures,
in this case the number was one). The posterior parameter formulas derived in Appendix
C from a gamma prior/exponential likelihood conjugate pair assume a likelihood formed
from failure censored data. Our first data set was time truncated, but included no data on
the specific times of each component failure and repair within the test time period. This
made it impossible to model the likelihood of that data in as time censored. We therefore
made the approximation that this data set was failure truncated and used the formula
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Component

Component

Shape

Scale

2

Antenna

3

1/3725.9

MSS

0

MSS

6

1/10709.9

Likelihood

PPCU

0

Gamma

PPCU

1

1/62,662

Data: Test 1

R/E

3

Posterior

R/E

4

1/2117.9

RDP

3

Parameters

RDP

8

1/10709.9

RSP

0

RSP

4

1/10709.9

WGSW

0

WGSW

1

1/12751.7

Antenna

Failures

Test Time

1313.9

Tables 6: Likelihood data for the first operational test and resultant gamma posterior parameters
after applying Bayes’ Theorem to it and the NIST priors formed from legacy data

Component

Failures

Test Time

Component

Shape

Scale

Antenna

1

1046.5

Antenna

4

1/4772.4

MSS

N/A

MSS

6

1/10709.9

Likelihood

PPCU

N/A

Gamma

PPCU

1

1/62,662

Data: Test 2

R/E

1

Posterior

R/E

5

1/3870

RDP

N/A

Parameters

RDP

8

1/10709.9

RSP

N/A

RSP

4

1/10709.9

WGSW

N/A

WGSW

1

1/12751.7

1752.1

Table 7: Likelihood data for the second operational test and resultant gamma posterior parameters after
applying Bayes’ Theorem to it and the priors defined as the posteriors generated from the first test data

derived in Appendix C to define the first set of gamma posterior parameters. It is
important to note that, as a consequence of this approximation, the mean time-betweenfailures for the first data set is overstated. Unfortunately, we cannot quantify this bias
due to lack of data from the test team. This situation highlighted the need for
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standardization in data collection across the detachments at AFOTEC and is being
addressed as part of an organization-wide effort to standardize processes.

To incorporate information from both sets of test results into our component-level
uncertainty distributions, we applied Bayes’s Theorem twice. We used the NIST gamma
priors and the likelihoods of the first test data set to produce component gamma
posteriors. These posteriors then became the priors updated by the likelihood of the
second set of test data (cf. Tables 6 and 7). The dispersion in the last set of gamma
posteriors represents the component-level epistemic uncertainty remaining after
incorporating all available information into the model (c.f. Figure 7).

MSS Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

1000

Density

600

500

400
200

0

0

Density

800

1500

1000

Antenna Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

0.000

Antenna Lambda

0.001

0.002
MSS Lambda

42

0.003

0.004

RE Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

0

0

10000

200

400

Density

30000
20000

Density

40000

600

50000

60000

PPCU Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.000

0.004

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

RE Lambda

PPCU Lambda

RSP Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

Density

Density
0

0

500

500

1000

1000

1500

2000

1500

RDP Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.000

0.004

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

RSP Lambda

RDP Lambda

Density

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

WGSW Lambda Gamma Epistemic Undertainty Pdf

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

WGSW Lambda

Figure 7: Plots of gamma posterior probability distribution functions summarizing the epistemic
uncertainty probability space for each component
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2.4

Sampling-Based Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis

For this portion of the analysis, we produced two sets of 100 sample vectors using LHS,
as described in the preliminary sensitivity analysis section. To generate the first set, we
sampled from all of the posterior gamma uncertainty distributions defined above. We
generated the second set by sampling only from the driver (MSS and antenna) posterior
distributions, keeping all other component rate parameters fixed at their point estimates.
Each sample vector served as input for one Raptor simulation with run time 131,534.1
hours and repetition level 100. Raptor outputted two sets of 100 B-2 RMP system-level
MTBF estimate, one for the full model, the other for the reduced model. The dispersion
in the estimates generated for each model represents the epistemic uncertainty in the B-2
RMP system-level MTBF.

To gauge model sensitivity with the input parameters distributed as gammas for the full
model, we produced scatter plots and ran the same non-randomness tests performed in the
preliminary sensitivity analysis. The results were not drastically different from those in
the preliminary sensitivity analysis, as can be seen in Figure 8 and Table 8, with the
exception that the RE appears to be less decisively a third place driver in the system
MTBF. The resultant epistemic uncertainty CDF for the full model is shown in Figure 9.
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Common Means Test

Common Locations Test

Statistical

(CMT)

(CLT)

Independence Test (SI)

Input

MSS

Antenna

MSS

Antenna

RE

MSS

Antenna

RE

P-val

0

0

0

0

0.0488

0

0.0018

0.0488

Regression Test

Quadratic Regression Test

(REG)

(QREG)

Input

MSS

Antenna

WGSW

MSS

Antenna

WGSW

RE

P-val

0

0

0.0164

0

0

0.0224

0.0254

Table 8: Non-randomness test results for the full model with each component
defined by its gamma posterior distribution
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Scatterplot of B2-Modernized Radar System MTBF vs. RSP Lambda
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Figure 8: Scatterplots of System MTBF vs. component parameter
for distributed as a gamma posterior defined in Table 7
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Figure 9: Plot of epistemic uncertainty histogram and CDF from a sample of 100 MTBF estimations
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Figure 10 demonstrates the magnitude of the sampling error from the two sampling loops
in the simulation run on the full model. The confidence bands can be interpreted as
random variable vectors that, when formed repeatedly, will contain the true epistemic
uncertainty CDF from the full model 95% of the time.

Figure 10: Plot of system uncertainty CDF bounded by 95% point-wise confidence bands

Figure 11 shows the epistemic uncertainty CDF for the driver (reduced) model plotted
next to that generated from the full model. Because all non-driving component
parameters remained fixed at point-estimate values, the system epistemic uncertainty
CDF for the reduced model summarizes the effect of epistemic uncertainty in the antenna
and MSS on epistemic uncertainty in the system MTBF. Superimposing the full and
reduced model CDFs gave us a qualitative idea of well the driver model captured the true
epistemic uncertainty in the system MTBF. We were interested in benchmarking the
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preliminary sensitivity results for future reference by checking whether our interpretation
of the results in this initial project were sound enough to extend to future projects.

Full Model (Black) and Driver Model (Red) System Level MTBF Epistemic Uncertainty CDF
1
80% Credible Interval: Full Model
0.9
80% Credible Interval: Driver Model
0.8

Mean MTBF Full Model = 368.33
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0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400 420 440 460 480 500 520 540 560 580 600 620 640 660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800
System MTBF

Figure 11: Plot of full model and driver model epistemic uncertainty CDFs

However, the full and reduced model epistemic uncertainty CDFs in Figure 11 are
superimposed out of context. As shown by the 95% confidence bands in Figure 11, nonnegligible sampling error from the two sampling loops leads to dispersion in our estimate
of the full model epistemic uncertainty CDF. Figure 12 demonstrates that the driver
model epistemic uncertainty CDF falls within these 95% point-wise confidence bands.
Thus, within the 95% confidence bounds defining the sampling error, the two curves are
equivalent.
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Figure 12: Plot of system uncertainty CDF for the full model (black) and the driver model (blue) bounded
by 95% point-wise confidence bands estimating sampling error in full model MTBF determination.

Common statistics describing the central tendency and dispersion in the MTBF
uncertainty distribution (e.g. mean and standard deviation,) can be found below in Table
9. Because the MTBF uncertainty distribution is reasonably symmetric, the mean and the
80% credible interval as statistics describe its central tendency and dispersion,
respectively. Credible intervals are interpreted as direct probability statements about the
variable summarized by a distribution. Note that credible intervals are interpreted
differently than classical confidence intervals; many people find the interpretation of the
credible interval more intuitively direct than that of a confidence interval.
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The mean MTBF for the full model occurs at 368.33 hours while the 80% credible
interval spans 240.3 hours to 535.1 hours. In this case, an 80% credible interval means
that the true B-2 RMP MTBF lies in the interval [240.3, 535.1] hours with a probability
of 80%. The mean of the driver model MTBF, 369.4 hours, is very close to that of the
full model. However, the epistemic uncertainty CDF for the driver model underestimates
the uncertainty in the MTBF distribution, having an 80% credible interval about 25 hours
shorter than that of the full model CDF.

Sample Size

Central

Median

Tendency

(hours)

(hours)

Full Model

Driver Model

100

100

352.66

345.33

368.33

369.4

118.61

118.36

[243.3, 535.1]

[239.74, 506.89]

Mean
(hours)

Standard Deviation

Dispersion

(hours)

(hours)

80% Credible
Interval
(hours)

Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the system MTBF epistemic uncertainty distribution as determined using
for full model and the reduced model including epistemic uncertainty in driving component parameters

Because we reduced the dimensionality of the epistemic uncertainty space from 14 to 4,
this deviation is not surprising. It is possible that including the RE epistemic uncertainty
in the model, the third most influential component isolated in the non-randomness tests,
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would result in more accurate dispersion estimates for the reduced model system MTBF.
However, since the magnitude of the sampling error was large in the analyses, it is
difficult to gauge whether the deviation of the reduced model uncertainty CDF from that
of the full model is due to sampling error or due to the reduction itself.

2.5

Conclusion

The May 2008 Defense Science Board report on Developmental Test and Evaluation
identified the need for robust reliability, availability, and maintainability programs to
address sustainability problems identified during testing. Operational testing for
reliability requires appropriate test data to bolster conclusions and provide decisionquality information. As technology evolves and technological complexity increases,
analytical techniques intended to describe and understand capabilities must also improve
to keep pace. Analytical practices heavily influenced by classical statistical techniques
require significant amounts of test data to provide accurate and precise conclusions.
Unfortunately, test and analysis costs are often directly proportional to the technological
sophistication of the system being characterized. With rising acquisition costs, test and
analysis cost will increase as well. The direct competition for limited resources impacts
the availability of funds for testing and precipitates the necessity for test organizations to
produce quality results with limited data.

The techniques described in the main body of the paper identified a reliability analysis
procedure to contend specifically with increasingly common low data scenarios
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encountered during OT. The process hones reliability analysis by targeting important
drivers in system-level reliability mean responses, by maximizing the use of available
developmental test data, non-testing and legacy testing information from diverse sources
for these drivers, and by making system-level inferences based upon more prolific
component-level information.

Sensitivity analysis techniques isolate important drivers in system-level reliability. When
the drivers are known, resources for testing along with the research and analysis can be
focused on characterizing these drivers. Resources dedicated to testing the reliability of
components driving system-level reliability yield more prolific test data for these
components. Resources dedicated to accumulating non-testing or legacy testing data
about component-level drivers via elicitation and research yield additional reliability
information, thereby increasing the quality and density of information available for
analysis.

Bayesian inference provides a means to incorporate information from these diverse
sources into one distribution summarizing available information about important
component parameters. The method leverages information from similar or legacy
components, research and development, and DT data. Uncertainty propagation via
layered sampling produces system-level epistemic and aleatory uncertainty distributions
summarizing the cumulative effect of component-level epistemic and aleatory uncertainty
and mean-responses on the system-level reliability metrics.
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Results from applying the Bayesian and sampling process include system-level reliability
estimations as well as measures, defined by dispersion in system-level parameter and
parent distributions, benchmarking the level of approximation involved in the analysis.
In other words, this enhanced analytical process answers two questions:

1) Approximately, how reliable is a system?
2) How approximate is this estimate of its reliability?

Standard reliability block diagram algorithms answer only the first question. Answers to
both of the questions allow decision makers to determine the risk involved in purchasing
and operating a system and, consequently, whether further testing or analysis is
necessary.
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Appendix A

This appendix demonstrates the analytical determination of the system-level time-tofailure distribution for the RBD depicted in Figure 1 (for further details consult reference
[17]).

First, the innermost parallel and series structure distributions combine to form
distributions summarizing the failure behavior of the structures.

F23a = F2aF3a
The probability that the parallel structure including blocks 2 and 3 fails is the probability
that 2 and 3 fail, e.g. the probability of the event defined by the intersection of block 2
and block 3 time-to-failure event sets.
F67a = 1 – R67a = 1 – R6aR7a = 1-(1-F6a)(1-F7a)
The probability that the series structure including blocks 6 and 7 fails is the probability
that 6 or 7 fails, e.g. the probability of the event defined by the union of block 6 and
block 7 time-to-failure event sets. Here, R67a denotes the reliability of the series structure
containing blocks 6 and 7.
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F1, F23 and F4 combine to form the time-to-failure distribution of the series structure
circled below.

F1234a = 1 – R1234a = 1 – R1aR23a(R4a = 1 – (1 – F1a)(1 - F23a)(1 – F4a)
The parallel structure time-to-failure distribution including the two block strings
combines F1234a with F67a.

F123467a = (F1234a)(F67a)
Finally, the system time-to-failure distribution, Fsa, combines F123467a and F5a represented
in the series structure below.
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Fsa = 1 – Rsa = 1 – (1 – F123467a)(1 – F5a)
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Appendix B

The NIST webpage on Bayesian Methods in reliability analysis provides a formula for
defining a gamma prior from historical data [1]. This appendix details the derivation of
this formula. Suppose the historical data describes n time increments in which n-1
failures occur. This would be the case, for example, if a test time is truncated at tc before
the nth failure occurs for some system. Time truncated data is also called Type I censored
data [3]. If Tk denotes the time of the kth failure in the time increment [0, tc ],
is the time between the (k-1)th and the kth failure. When the

are

independent and identically distributed (steady-state periods in the system’s life history)
as exponentials with parameter, λ, the likelihood function summarizing the time-betweenfailures events is the product of the probability of each time-between-failures event
occurring:
, where

.

Since the last time-between-failures measurement is truncated before a failure occurs, it
is the event that
probability (1– F(

is not a time-between-failures event and has associated
, where

is the cdf of the time-between-failures random

variable [3].
d = 1-1+
So, the likelihood becomes:
=
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Bayes’ Theorem generates a posterior using the likelihood of the historical data. Because
no data about the system exists prior to the historical data, the input prior for Bayes’
Theorem should contain only the only information we have about ,the interval defining
its domain. Since is defined on the positive real line, its domain is

Forming a

prior using this information is not straighforward.

Several approaches to forming such noninformative priors exist in the literature. These
include using Jeffery's Rule or seeking transformations for which the likelihood is
approximately data transformed (e.g. one-to-one transformations on the parameter of
interest that result in a likelihood which shifts location only upon changes in the data;
dispersion and shape remain constant) [18]. While these methods are rigorous and
complete, they require significant effort. Instead, we resort to a simplifying
approximation that models the input prior as a uniform distribution:

.
In this case, Bayes’ Theorem yields:
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To derive the posterior given under the constraint that we know nothing but the limits of
the domain of , we take the limit of

as

∞:

=
The integral in the denominator can be solved using integration by parts, but this involves
some tedious work. Alternatively, multiplying and dividing the integral in the
denominator by

puts it into a familiar form:
=

.

And we are left with:

This posterior can now be used as a prior for new data as it becomes available.
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Appendix C

This appendix details the analytical determination of a posterior derived from a likelihood
generated from i.i.d. interfailure times,

, and a gamma prior. All parameters

are general. The gamma is assumed to be a two parameter distribution (
and

is the shape

is the scale parameter) with a mean equal to the product of its parameters. The

are assumed to be failure censored data (Type II censoring), e.g. data collection
terminated after the nth failure. For Type II censoring, the likelihood takes the form:

When finding the posterior of a conjugate pair, the posterior distribution type matches the
prior distribution type but has modified parameters. In this case, the posterior will be a
gamma with parameters updated to reflect the information contained in the exponential
likelihood.
Exponential Likelihood:
Gamma Prior:

Posterior:

Since

=

is not a function of , we can pull it out of the integral in the denominator

and cancel it with

in the numerator.

Posterior:
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Solution of the integral in the denominator:

=

.

Now, we get:
Posterior:

As expected, the posterior is distributed as a gamma with shape parameter
scale parameter

.
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, and

Appendix D

The following is code written in R to estimate point-wise confidence bands defining
sampling error in the inner MC sampling loop and outer LHS sampling loop that
determine the epistemic uncertainty CDF.

####Function to find F(X=x.n), the step function of the CDF of a sample, xsample.vec, evaluated at
####x.n
cdfpoint <- function(x.n, xsample.vec){
return(mean(xsample.vec <= x.n))
}
####Function to find a vector, cdf.vec, from a vector, x.vec, of x's
Fx <- function(xsample.vec,x.vec){
cdf.vec <- rep(0,length(x.vec))
for(i in 1:length(x.vec)){
cdf.vec[i]<-cdfpoint(x.vec[i],xsample.vec)}
return(cdf.vec)}
####Script to generate Z(x) matrix, quantiles(t), and pointwise C.I.s at each x
##Read in system MTBF data from files on desktop
mydata.data<-read.table(file="C:\\Documents and Settings\\Bea.Yu\\Desktop\\B2data.txt",
header = T)
##Read in SEM data for each MTBF determination
sem.data <- read.table(file="C:\\Documents and Settings\\Bea.Yu\\Desktop\\sem.txt", header = T)
##Initialize variables
bs.n <- 1000
x.vec <- seq(from = 0, to = 800, by = 0.08)
MTBF.vec<-mydata.data[,8]
SEM.vec<-sem.data[,1]
lowerCI.vec<-rep(0,length(x.vec))
upperCI.vec<-rep(0,length(x.vec))
bs.mat <- matrix(0, nrow=bs.n, ncol=length(MTBF.vec))
bsobs.mat <-matrix(0, nrow=bs.n, ncol=length(MTBF.vec))
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sem.mat <- matrix(0, nrow=bs.n, ncol=length(SEM.vec))
bsobs_x.mat <- matrix(0, nrow=bs.n, ncol=length(x.vec))
Z_x.mat <- matrix(0, nrow=bs.n, ncol=length(x.vec))
quant.mat <- matrix(0, nrow=length(x.vec), ncol=2)
##Generate 1000 jostled bootstrap samples by taking a bootstrap sample of the LHS MTBF's,
##forming normals with mean=MTBF, std. dev.=SEM, sampling randomly once from each
##normal and replacing the MTBF with the random sample from the normal
for(k in 1:bs.n){
set.seed(k)
bs.mat[k,] <- MTBF.vec[sample(length(MTBF.vec),replace=TRUE)]
set.seed(k)
sem.mat[k,]<-SEM.vec[sample(length(SEM.vec),replace=TRUE)]
for(j in 1:length(MTBF.vec)){
bsobs.mat[k,j]<-rnorm(1,mean = bs.mat[k,j],sd = sem.mat[k,j])
}
}
##Generate a step function for the CDF of MTBF uncertainty
F_x.vec <- Fx(MTBF.vec,x.vec)
##Generate a step function for the jostled bootstrap samples and subtract this function
##evaluated at values in x.vec from the values of F_t.vec evaluated at the same points
for(k in 1:bs.n){
bsobs_x.mat[k,] <- Fx(bsobs.mat[k,],x.vec)
Z_x.mat[k,] <- (F_x.vec - bsobs_x.mat[k,])
}
##Produce the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to estimate a 95% CI
for(j in 1:length(x.vec)){
quant.mat[j,] <- quantile(Z_x.mat[,j],probs=c(0.025,0.975),names = FALSE)
}
upperCI.vec <- (F_x.vec - quant.mat[,1])
lowerCI.vec <- (F_x.vec - quant.mat[,2])
plot(x.vec, F_x.vec, main = "Epistemic Uncertainty CDF for Full Model and Driver Model Bounded by
95% Confidence Bands", xlab = "System MTBF", ylab = "Probability", type = "l")
lines(x.vec,upperCI.vec, col = "red")
lines(x.vec,lowerCI.vec, col = "red")
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Appendix E

List of Acronyms
AFOTEC – Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
B-2 RMP – B-2 Radar Modernization Program
CDF – Cumulative Distribution Function
CI – Confidence Interval
CLT – Common Locations Test
CMT – Common Means Test
DT – Developmental Test
LHS – Latin Hypercube Sampling
NGC – Northrop Grumman Corporation
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
MC – Monte Carlo
MCMC – Markov Chain Monte Carlo
MSS – Motion Sensing System
MTBF – Mean Time Between Failures (statistic describing the mean uptime for a
repairable system)
MTTF – Mean Time To Failure (statistic describing the mean time to failure for a nonrepairable system)
OT – Operational Test
PPCU – Prime Power Conditioning Unit
QREG – Quadratic Regression Test for Non-Randomness
RBD – Reliability Block Diagram
RBD/MC – Reliability Block Diagram Model Using Monte Carlo Simulation
R & D – Research and Development
RDP – Undefined acronym for component in modernized radar
R/E – Receiver/Exciter
REG – Regression Test for Non-Randomness
RMP - Radar Modernization Program
RSP - Undefined acronym for component in modernized radar
SI – Statistical Independence Test
WG-SW – Wave-Guide Switch
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